Record Details

TRUST IN SUPERIORS AND DYSFUNCTIONAL BEHAVIORS : AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY ON BUDGETARY SLACK

Journal of Positive Management

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Field Value
 
Title TRUST IN SUPERIORS AND DYSFUNCTIONAL BEHAVIORS : AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY ON BUDGETARY SLACK
 
Creator Gilabert-Carreras, María; Pablo de Olavide University, Sevilla, Spain
Naranjo-Gil, David; Pablo de Olavide University, Sevilla, Spain
Gago, Susana; Carlos III University, Madrid, Spain
 
Subject
Budgetary slack; Trust; Subordinates vs. Superiors; Economic vs non-economic incentives

 
Description Purpose: This paper analyzes trust in superiors as an informal control mechanism to reduce budgetary slack. We examine how relationships between trust of subordinates in their superiors and economic incentive reduce the tendency of subordinates to create budgetary slack.Methodology: An experiment was designed with participants who play the role of manager or executive alternativelyFindings: Results show that the introduction of an economic incentive does not affect the relationship between trust and budgetary slack.Implications/limitations: This study will let organizations to further the budgeting process by using informal mechanism, such as trust, as a complement to traditional mechanism (e.g. monetary/ economic incentives). This enhances the effectiveness of the organization’s actions and policies. Originality/Value: The findings of this study complement the results of previous studies on how trust is related to financial and non-financial performance criteria.
 
Publisher Nicolaus Copernicus University
 
Contributor
 
Date 2014-06-09
 
Type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


 
Format application/pdf
 
Identifier http://apcz.umk.pl/czasopisma/index.php/JPM/article/view/JPM.2014.006
10.12775/JPM.2014.006
 
Source Journal of Positive Management; Vol 5, No 1 (2014); 54-66
Journal of Positive Management; Vol 5, No 1 (2014); 54-66
2392-1412
2083-103X
 
Language eng
 
Relation http://apcz.umk.pl/czasopisma/index.php/JPM/article/view/JPM.2014.006/3792
 
Coverage