Record Details

Hurdle Rate and Adverse Selection on Escalation of Commitment

Shirkah Journal of Economics and Business

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Field Value
 
Title Hurdle Rate and Adverse Selection on Escalation of Commitment
 
Creator Ridha, M. Arsyadi
 
Subject —
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Description This article tests the effect of hurdle rates and adverse selection on escalation of commitment. Participants consist of 135 junior managers who had passed two course of management. The result indicates that the managers with adverse selection conditions will tend not to continue unfavorable projects. This research also affirms that the managers with adverse selection conditions will be more likely not to continue projects that are not favorable under the conditions of self-set hurdle rates compared to the conditions of organization-set hurdle rates. This article may contribute to empirical evidence of a decline in comprehensive escalation of commitments. Keywords: adverse selection, self-set hurdle rates, organization-set hurdle rates, escalation  of commitment
 
Publisher Faculty of Islamic Economics and Business, Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN) Surakarta
 
Contributor —
 
Date 2019-01-10
 
Type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Peer-reviewed Article
 
Format application/pdf
 
Identifier http://shirkah.or.id/new-ojs/index.php/home/article/view/202
10.22515/shirkah.v3i2.202
 
Source Shirkah: Journal of Economics and Business; Vol 3, No 2 (2018)
2503-4243
2503-4235
 
Language eng
 
Relation http://shirkah.or.id/new-ojs/index.php/home/article/view/202/52
 
Rights Copyright (c) 2019 Shirkah: Journal of Economics and Business
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0