Record Details

Optimal solution to cybercrimes: lessons from law and economics

Philippine Review of Economics

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Field Value
 
Title Optimal solution to cybercrimes: lessons from law and economics
 
Creator Majuca, Ruperto P.; De La Salle University
 
Subject law and economics, cybersecurity, interrelated risks, public goods, law enforcement
 
Description A model is presented wherein cybercrimes are addressed through a combination of private and public measures. This captures the substitutability of private and public responses and determines the optimal combination of these approaches. The socially optimal level of security is achieved by equalizing the marginal-benefit-to-marginal-cost ratios of each of the three alternatives: private security investment, nonrivalrous security investment, and law enforcement measures. The interrelatedness of Internet risks causes individual firms to underinvest in private and public security goods. The government thus lowers the level of police enforcement expenditures to induce firms to invest more in individual precautions. In certain conditions, cooperation results in socially optimal levels of expenditures in private and public security goods. The Shapley [1953] value can be used as a criterion for allocating the costs and benefits among the members of a security cooperative.JEL: K0
 
Publisher Philippine Review of Economics
 
Contributor —
 
Date 2014-06-16
 
Type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Peer-reviewed Article
 
Format application/pdf
 
Identifier http://www.econ.upd.edu.ph/pre/index.php/pre/article/view/904
 
Source Philippine Review of Economics; Vol 51, No 1 (2014); 84-116
1655-1516
 
Language eng
 
Relation http://www.econ.upd.edu.ph/pre/index.php/pre/article/view/904/804
 
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