Since 2014
Symmetry and Efficiency
Philippine Review of Economics
View Archive Info| Field | Value | |
| Title |
Symmetry and Efficiency
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| Creator |
Fabella, Raul V.
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| Subject |
—
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| Description |
We consider teams where information asymmetry (adverse selection and moral hazard) is minimized by entry point screening designed to produce homogenous membership and work group arrangements and job rotation that render effort at worst imperfectly observable. We show that under membership symmetry, budget balance and strict rationality, a self-enforcing Pareto efficient (cooperates) and envy-free solution is attainable if and only production technology is of a unique concave family. Even in the absence of moral hazard and adverse selection, a self-enforcing Pareto efficiency remains impossible outside this family.
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| Publisher |
Philippine Review of Economics
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| Contributor |
—
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| Date |
1997-06-20
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| Type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Peer-reviewed Article |
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| Format |
application/pdf
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| Identifier |
http://www.econ.upd.edu.ph/pre/index.php/pre/article/view/94
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| Source |
Philippine Review of Economics; Vol 34, No 1 (1997)
1655-1516 |
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| Language |
eng
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| Relation |
http://www.econ.upd.edu.ph/pre/index.php/pre/article/view/94/486
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| Rights |
Copyright (c) 2017 Philippine Review of Economics
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