Quantity-setting games with lifetime employment contracts as a strategic commitment
Philippine Review of Economics
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Title |
Quantity-setting games with lifetime employment contracts as a strategic commitment
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Creator |
Ohnishi, Kazuhiro; Institute for Basic Economic Science, Japan
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Subject |
quantity-setting model; substitute goods; complementary goods; lifetime employment contract
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Description |
This paper considers lifetime employment contracts asa strategic commitment and examines the respectiveequilibrium outcomes of the two cases of a quantity-setting duopoly game with substitute goods and a quantity-setting duopoly game with complementary goods. First, in the quantity-setting game with substitute goods, we find that there is an equilibrium in which both the firms adopt lifetime employment. Next, in the quantity-setting game withcomplementary goods, we find that there is an equilibrium in which at least one firm adopts lifetime employment, and that lifetime employment is beneficial for both firms.JEL classification: C72, D21, L13
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Publisher |
Philippine Review of Economics
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Contributor |
—
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Date |
2012-12-17
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Type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Peer-reviewed Article |
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Format |
application/pdf
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Identifier |
http://www.econ.upd.edu.ph/pre/index.php/pre/article/view/884
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Source |
Philippine Review of Economics; Vol 49, No 2 (2012); 25-40
1655-1516 |
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Language |
eng
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Relation |
http://www.econ.upd.edu.ph/pre/index.php/pre/article/view/884/783
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Rights |
Copyright (c) 2017 Philippine Review of Economics
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