Since 2014
An asymmetric job auction model
Journal of Economic & Financial Studies
View Archive Info| Field | Value | |
| Title |
An asymmetric job auction model
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| Creator |
Wang, Xiaoting
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| Subject |
Economics
Heterogeneity; Job auction; Steady state equilibrium. D83, J64, E24. |
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| Description |
In this paper we investigate a labor market with search frictions. Workers with heterogeneous productivity apply to different types of job vacancies by bidding the optimal profits that they can offer the firms. In the steady state equilibrium, the most capable workers separate themselves by only bidding at jobs requiring high skills, while applicants in the middle of the productivity distribution pool with the low-productivity workers and apply for jobs requiring low skills.
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| Publisher |
LAR Center Press
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| Contributor |
the National Natural Science Foundation of China
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| Date |
2015-09-23
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| Type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Peer-reviewed Article |
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| Format |
application/pdf
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| Identifier |
http://journalofeconomics.org/index.php/site/article/view/167
10.18533/jefs.v3i05.167 |
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| Source |
Journal of Economic & Financial Studies; Vol 3, No 05 (2015): October; 53-62
2379-9471 2379-9463 |
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| Language |
eng
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| Relation |
http://journalofeconomics.org/index.php/site/article/view/167/267
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| Rights |
Copyright (c) 2015 Xiaoting Wang
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 |
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