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(DP 1991-14) Rotten Kid Transfers and Pareto Efficiency in Nonsymmetric Teams
UPSE Discussion Papers
View Archive Info| Field | Value | |
| Title |
(DP 1991-14) Rotten Kid Transfers and Pareto Efficiency in Nonsymmetric Teams
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| Creator |
Fabella, Raul V.
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| Description |
We show that there is an exhaustive sharing scheme involving "rotten kid transfers" that allow Pareto efficiency in nonsymmetric teams where at least one member is team-spirited. The optimal "rotten kid transfers" from team-spirited members required to keep self-interested members from shirking are determined. If the affordability condition is satisfied, the optimal "rotten kid transfers" induce Pareto efficiency in teams.
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| Publisher |
UPSE Discussion Papers
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| Contributor |
—
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| Date |
2010-08-28
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| Type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Peer-reviewed Article |
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| Format |
application/pdf
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| Identifier |
http://www.econ.upd.edu.ph/dp/index.php/dp/article/view/223
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| Source |
UPSE Discussion Papers; 1991
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| Language |
eng
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| Relation |
http://www.econ.upd.edu.ph/dp/index.php/dp/article/view/223/298
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