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Option compensation and optimism bias in management earnings forecasts

The Journal of Finance and Accounting Research

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Title Option compensation and optimism bias in management earnings forecasts
 
Creator Chi, Yu-Ho
Ziebart, David A
Campbell, Terry
 
Description We examine the relation between the option compensation received by corporate managers and the extent of optimistic bias in their earnings forecasts. Specifically, we are interested in the extent to managers with a high amount of option compensation tend to have a self-serving optimism. We examine whether there is evidence consistent with the argument that managers have a self-serving interest to issue optimistic forecasts since their compensation is a function of stock price and higher earnings usually result in a higher share price. We hypothesize that management’ optimism (optimistic bias in their earnings forecasts) increases as their stock option compensation increases. Our empirical evidence indicates that highly compensated managers are associated with the likelihood of issuing upwardly biased (i.e. more optimistic) earnings forecasts.
 
Publisher Department of Finance, School of Business and Economics, University of Management and Technology, Lahore, Pakistan
 
Date 2019-08-31
 
Type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
 
Format application/pdf
 
Identifier https://ojs.umt.edu.pk/index.php/jfar/article/view/105
 
Source Journal of Finance and Accounting Research; Vol 1 No 2 (2019): August; 1-23
2663-838X
2617-2232
10.32350/jfar/2019/0102
 
Language eng
 
Relation https://ojs.umt.edu.pk/index.php/jfar/article/view/105/45
 
Rights Copyright (c) 2019 Yu-Ho Chi, David A Ziebart, Terry Campbell
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0