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International positive production externalities under a transfer payment scheme – the case for cooperation
Journal of Economics and Business - SPOUDAI
View Archive Info| Field | Value | |
| Title |
International positive production externalities under a transfer payment scheme – the case for cooperation
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| Creator |
Savvidis, Charalampos
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| Subject |
Optimal Taxation; International Policy Coordination; Production Externalities; Foreign Aid; Intertemporal Choice.
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| Description |
In the present work we try to find out whether the existence of positive international externalities generates an incentive for cooperation between governments and if the adoption of a transfer payments scheme moderates that intensive. We adopt a simple economic model incorporating the international linkage of national economies. Utility proves always to be higher when countries cooperate than when they play Nash to each other. We then add a transfer payment scheme and prove it intensifies the intensive to cooperate, since a moral hazard problem arises on the top of the free riding problem. JEL Classification: H23; F35; F42 Keywords: Optimal Taxation, International Policy Coordination, Production Externalities, Foreign Aid, Intertemporal Choice. |
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| Publisher |
University of Piraeus
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| Contributor |
—
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| Date |
2013-01-25
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| Type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion — |
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| Format |
application/pdf
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| Identifier |
https://spoudai.unipi.gr/index.php/spoudai/article/view/27
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| Source |
SPOUDAI - Journal of Economics and Business; Vol 61, No 1-2 (2011); 80-117
2241-424X 1105-8919 |
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| Language |
eng
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| Relation |
https://spoudai.unipi.gr/index.php/spoudai/article/view/27/64
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