Record Details

Public sector, information and incentives

Journal of Economic and Social Thought

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Field Value
 
Title Public sector, information and incentives
 
Creator LANE, Jan-Erik; Univ of Freiburg Germany Jan-Erik Lane, fellow with Public Policy Institute, BELGRADE Address: 10 Charles Humbert, 1205 Geneva; 559 A, 3rd Floor, Thuya Street, 9 th Quarter, Yangon. Myanmar.
 
Subject Opportunism; Shirking; Pretending; Asymmetrical knowledge; Hobbes; Montesquieu.
B14; B24; B51.
 
Description Abstract. What is true information in today's world?  The hunt for information is on, not only in the private sector - market trends and enterprise data ' bur also on the public sector. Information is strongly linked with incentives: leak news and you have an extra rent. This paper tries to model the crucial role of information  and it's incentives in government and it started in the public sector.Keywords. Opportunism, Shirking, Pretending, Asymmetrical knowledge, Hobbes,  Montesquieu.JEL. B14, B24, B51.
 
Publisher Journal of Economic and Social Thought
Journal of Economic and Social Thought
 
Contributor
 
Date 2019-12-30
 
Type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

 
Format application/pdf
 
Identifier http://www.kspjournals.org/index.php/JEST/article/view/1980
10.1453/jest.v6i4.1980
 
Source Journal of Economic and Social Thought; Vol 6, No 4 (2019): December; 243-251
Journal of Economic and Social Thought; Vol 6, No 4 (2019): December; 243-251
2149-0422
 
Language eng
 
Relation http://www.kspjournals.org/index.php/JEST/article/view/1980/2015
 
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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0