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A Theoretical Framework and Experimental Program for Understanding Rule Preference, Fairness Cognition and Trust

International Business and Management

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Field Value
 
Title A Theoretical Framework and Experimental Program for Understanding Rule Preference, Fairness Cognition and Trust
 
Creator ZHANG, Ping
 
Subject
Rules preferences; Fairness cognition; Trust experiment; Veto purchasing

 
Description Based on the latest literatures, the paper proposes one theoretical framework: individuals pay general attention to rules of game and allocation process, but not just to results, produce fairness cognition for different resource allocation schemes through rules preferences and behavior expectation about partner and decide whether to accept allocation results; individual trust level is significantly associated with pro-society of partner, while this significance degree of correlation depends on fairness cognition. To further check existence of rules preferences and the influential factors, the paper designs one dictator game with veto purchasing (it can be converted into ultimatum game with decision position of both parties relatively more equal through purchasing and exercising veto) and trust game experiment, and sorts according to the veto bidding through inducing participants to state preference for two kinds of rules of game, measures fairness cognition for allocation scheme and tests role of two above on trust decision.
 
Publisher Canadian Research & Development Center of Sciences and Cultures
 
Contributor
 
Date 2015-10-31
 
Type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Peer-reviewed Article

 
Format application/pdf
 
Identifier http://www.cscanada.net/index.php/ibm/article/view/7734
10.3968/7734
 
Source International Business and Management; Vol 11, No 2 (2015): International Business and Management; 81-86
1923-8428
1923-841X
 
Language eng
 
Relation http://www.cscanada.net/index.php/ibm/article/view/7734/7734.pdf
 
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