Record Details


Field	Value

Title	Optimal Auctions of Procurement Contracts

Creator	Birulin, Oleksii

Description	We consider tenders/auctions for the procurement of items that do not exist at the time of the tender. The cost of production is subject to ex-post shocks, i.e. cost overruns, which cannot be contracted away or insured at the time of tender. The contractors may default due to the cost overruns once the project is underway. We consider a simple contract that specifies the payment in case of default and the award that is paid upon successful project completion. This contract is allocated at the tender and the award part is determined by competitive bidding. We characterize bidding behaviour of contractors in standard tenders and derive the implications for the buyer’s expected cost minimization.

Publisher	The University of Sydney

Contributor	—

Date	2014-03-24

Type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Peer-reviewed Article

Format	application/pdf

Identifier	https://openjournals.library.sydney.edu.au/index.php/OEW/article/view/7538

Source	Organizational Economics Proceedings; Vol 2, No 1 (2013): 7th Annual Organizational Economics Workshop July 2013 2201-8468

Language	eng

Relation	https://openjournals.library.sydney.edu.au/index.php/OEW/article/view/7538/7854

Since 2014