Record Details

On cost overruns in procurement

Organizational Economics Proceedings

View Archive Info
 
 
Field Value
 
Title On cost overruns in procurement
 
Creator Birulin, Oleksii
Izmalkov, Sergei
 
Description We consider auctions/tenders for the procurement of goods and services in the setting where the potential contractors face ex-post risks that may lead to cost overruns. The contractors have limited access to credit and are protected by limited liability. We identify the trade-offs that the procurement agency faces in such settings and show that the procuring agency minimizing the expected costs of the project greatly benefits by allocating a share of the award ex-ante, at the time of contracting, with the remainder due ex-post, after the completion of the project.
 
Publisher The University of Sydney
 
Contributor —
 
Date 2013-03-14
 
Type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Peer-reviewed Article
 
Format application/pdf
 
Identifier https://openjournals.library.sydney.edu.au/index.php/OEW/article/view/6704
 
Source Organizational Economics Proceedings; Vol 1, No 1 (2012): 6th Annual Organizational Economics Workshop July 2012
2201-8468
 
Language eng
 
Relation https://openjournals.library.sydney.edu.au/index.php/OEW/article/view/6704/7475