Record Details

Optimal Incentives in Problem Solving Teams

Organizational Economics Proceedings

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Field Value
 
Title Optimal Incentives in Problem Solving Teams
 
Creator Meagher, Kieron
Prasad, Suraj
 
Description Workers in problem solving teams- these are short term teams that are set up to generate ideas for improving a production process or a product- are often rewarded through group incentive pay. This is even though group incentives give workers an incentive to free ride. In our paper, we show how problem solving creates implicit incentives to reduce free riding, which in turn lowers the cost of using group incentive pay. In fact, when an employer has initial bargaining power and implicit incentives are strong, group incentive pay yields higher profits than monitoring workers, even when monitoring is costless.
 
Publisher The University of Sydney
 
Contributor —
 
Date 2013-01-30
 
Type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Peer-reviewed Article
 
Format application/pdf
 
Identifier https://openjournals.library.sydney.edu.au/index.php/OEW/article/view/6708
 
Source Organizational Economics Proceedings; Vol 1, No 1 (2012): 6th Annual Organizational Economics Workshop July 2012
2201-8468
 
Language eng
 
Relation https://openjournals.library.sydney.edu.au/index.php/OEW/article/view/6708/7358