Since 2014
Research on Green Construction Supervision Mechanism Based on Evolutionary Game
World Journal of Social Science Research
View Archive Info| Field | Value | |
| Title |
Research on Green Construction Supervision Mechanism Based on Evolutionary Game
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| Creator |
Wei, Wei
Qin, Zhongfu |
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| Description |
On the basis of the analysis of the game relationship between the construction enterprise and the supervision department, the evolutionary game model of the green construction supervision is established. By analyzing the unilateral stability of the game player, it is found that when the regulatory probability of regulatory authorities is maintained at the corresponding regulatory probability of the mixed strategy equilibrium point, the green construction probability of construction enterprises will evolve to 100%, and has good stability. According to this, the supervision mechanism of setting the threshold of supervision probability is put forward so as to realize full coverage of green construction.
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| Publisher |
SCHOLINK CO.,LTD
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| Contributor |
—
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| Date |
2018-02-28
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| Type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Peer-reviewed Article |
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| Format |
application/pdf
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| Identifier |
http://www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/wjssr/article/view/1270
10.22158/wjssr.v5n1p98 |
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| Source |
World Journal of Social Science Research; Vol 5, No 1 (2018); p98
2332-5534 2375-9747 |
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| Language |
eng
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| Relation |
http://www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/wjssr/article/view/1270/1430
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| Rights |
Copyright (c) 2018 Wei Wei, Zhongfu Qin
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
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