Record Details

Can exit prizes induce lame ducks to shirk less? Experimental evidence

European Journal of Government and Economics

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Field Value
 
Title Can exit prizes induce lame ducks to shirk less? Experimental evidence
 
Creator Helland, Leif
Hovi, Jon
Monkerud, Lars
 
Subject overlapping generations; last period effects; legislatures
C7; C9; H4
 
Description Elected representatives serving their final period face only weak incentives to provide costly effort. However, overlapping generations (OLG) models suggest that exit prizes sustained by trigger strategies can induce representatives in their final period to provide such effort. We evaluate this hypothesis using a simple OLG public good experiment, the central treatment being whether exit prizes are permitted. We find that a significantly higher number of subjects in their final period contribute when exit prizes are permitted. However, this result does not originate from use of trigger strategies. More likely explanations include gift-exchange and focal-point effects.
 
Publisher Europa Grande
 
Contributor University of Oslo, Department of Political Science, and BI Norwegian Business School.
 
Date 2012-12-31
 
Type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
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Format application/pdf
 
Identifier http://www.ejge.org/index.php/ejge/article/view/13
 
Source European Journal of Government and Economics; Vol 1, No 2 (2012); 106-125
2254-7088
 
Language eng
 
Relation http://www.ejge.org/index.php/ejge/article/view/13/27
 
Rights Copyright (c) 2012 Leif Helland, Jon Hovi, Lars Monkerud
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0