Record Details

Tax Avoidance and Optimal Income Tax Enforcement

Journal of Tax Administration

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Field Value
 
Title Tax Avoidance and Optimal Income Tax Enforcement
 
Creator Gamannossi degl’Innocenti, Duccio
Rablen, Matthew
 
Description We examine the optimal auditing problem of a tax authority when taxpayers can choose both to evade and avoid. For a convex penalty function, the incentive-compatibility constraints may bind for the richest taxpayer and at a positive level of both evasion and avoidance. The audit function is non-increasing in reported income, and is higher for progressive tax functions than for regressive tax functions. Higher marginal tax rates increase the incentives for non-compliance, overturning the well-known Yitzhaki paradox.
 
Publisher Journal of Tax Administration
 
Contributor —
 
Date 2017-12-06
 
Type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Peer-reviewed Article
 
Format application/pdf
 
Identifier http://JoTA.website/article/view/143
 
Source Journal of Tax Administration; Vol 3, No 2 (2017)
2059-190X
 
Language eng
 
Relation http://JoTA.website/article/view/143/108
 
Rights Copyright (c) 2017 Journal of Tax Administration