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Corruption and discrimination in Douala metropolis public hospitals of Cameroon

Journal of Economics Library

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Title Corruption and discrimination in Douala metropolis public hospitals of Cameroon
 
Creator YAMB, Benjamin; University of Douala
BAYEMI, Oscar;

Faculty of Economics and Applied Management (FSEGA), University of Douala, P.O Box 2701, Cameroon.

. (237) 677 76 43 10

. bayemioscar@yahoo.fr
 
Subject Corruption with and without theft; Discrimination at first degree; Health system; Odds ratios; Cameroon.
D40; I10; I14; I15.
 
Description Abstract. The problem that arises is how the State official in a monopoly situation maximizes the value of bribes collected, by selling public services to users? To answer this question, we show that the State agent in a monopoly situation can discriminate users according to their characteristics in order to collect more possible bribes. The Shleifer and Vishny’ simple monopoly model is therefore limited. The survey of patients of nine public hospitals in Douala revealed the existence of two forms of corruption at consultation: corruption without theft and corruption with theft. An evaluation of maximizing the earnings of medical doctors using odds ratios, showed that in the pursuit of these gains and whatever the form of corruption practiced, the State agent plays not only on amounts of bribes paid, but also on users’ characteristics. However, for amounts between 3,000 FCFA and 5,000 FCFA, our results revealed that the doctor will tend to practice the form of corruption without theft on men, the wealthiest, the learned and the old where he/she would draw the greatest possible gain.Keywords. Corruption with and without theft, Discrimination at first degree, Health system, Odds ratios, Cameroon.JEL. D40, I10, I14, I15.
 
Publisher Journal of Economics Library
 
Contributor —
 
Date 2017-12-18
 
Type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Peer-reviewed Article
 
Format application/pdf
 
Identifier http://www.kspjournals.org/index.php/JEL/article/view/1480
10.1453/jel.v4i4.1480
 
Source Journal of Economics Library; Vol 4, No 4 (2017): December; 502-513
2149-2379
 
Language eng
 
Relation http://www.kspjournals.org/index.php/JEL/article/view/1480/1461
http://www.kspjournals.org/index.php/JEL/article/downloadSuppFile/1480/735
http://www.kspjournals.org/index.php/JEL/article/downloadSuppFile/1480/736
http://www.kspjournals.org/index.php/JEL/article/downloadSuppFile/1480/737
http://www.kspjournals.org/index.php/JEL/article/downloadSuppFile/1480/738
http://www.kspjournals.org/index.php/JEL/article/downloadSuppFile/1480/739
 
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