Record Details


Field	Value

Title	Bundling Strategy For A Follower

Creator	Chang, Ming-Chung

Description	A follower in a market always uses a bundling strategy as a marketing strategy to increase profit and to change its market status. In this paper, the relationship between the main goods and bundling goods is substitutive, independent, or complementary. A Stackelberg game is applied to capture the competitive relationship between a leader and a follower. A follower uses a bundling strategy as a marketing strategy, but a leader does not. This study reveals that a follower will become a leader when he (or she) sells two products that are low substitution goods. However, it induces a social welfare to decrease when a follower bundles goods. This paper illustrates that a bundling action can invert a follower’s market status. However, the inversion on a follower’s status does not promote the social welfare.

Publisher	The Clute Institute

Date	2010-12-30

Type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Peer-reviewed Article

Format	application/pdf

Identifier	http://clutejournals.com/index.php/JBER/article/view/758 10.19030/jber.v8i9.758

Source	Journal of Business & Economics Research (JBER); Vol 8 No 9 (2010) 2157-8893 1542-4448 10.19030/jber.v8i9

Language	eng

Relation	http://clutejournals.com/index.php/JBER/article/view/758/743

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