Record Details

The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament

Journal of Technology Management & Innovation

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Field Value
 
Title The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament
 
Creator Mukherjee, Arijit
Wang, Leonard F.S.
 
Subject R&D tournament; Excessive entry; Insufficient entry
 
Description In a R&D tournament setting with free entry and knowledge spillover, we show that the society would suffer from excessive entry and the patent holder would endure lower profits than non-patent holders because it bears the cost of commercializing and further technology development, while the other firms are beneficiaries of the spillover effects. This result is instructive to R&D and competition policy.
 
Publisher Facultad de Economía y Negocios, Universidad Alberto Hurtado
 
Contributor
 
Date 2011-11-24
 
Type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Artículo revisado por pares
 
Format application/pdf
 
Identifier http://www.jotmi.org/index.php/GT/article/view/art221
10.4067/S0718-27242011000400006
 
Source Journal of Technology Management & Innovation; Vol 6, No 4 (2011); 73-79
Journal of Technology Management & Innovation; Vol 6, No 4 (2011); 73-79
0718-2724
 
Language eng
 
Relation http://www.jotmi.org/index.php/GT/article/view/art221/655