Since 2014
Economic Analysis Review
View Archive Info| Field | Value | |
| Title |
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Regulador No Benevolente y Asimetrias de Informacion. Aproximacion con un Modelo de Agencia |
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| Creator |
Espinoza Vasquez, Lourdes Marcela
Rubin de Celis Cedro, Raúl |
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| Subject |
Benevolent regulator, optimal prices, information asymmetries, incentive compatibility, participation constraint
Benevolent regulator, optimal prices, information asymmetries, incentive compatibility, participation constraint |
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| Description |
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This document presents a theoretical model of a non-benevolent regulator and cost heterogeneous operators where the objective function to be maximized, besides considering consumers’ and producers’ surpluses, includes rent seeking from at least one of the operators that directly benefits the regulator. Under these conditions, the resulting regulatory contract complies with individual rationality and incentive compatibility; however, it introduces distortions that affect the most efficient operators resulting in costs to society as a whole. The main results from this model point towards the need to evaluate the relevance of maintaining regulation under such settings. |
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| Publisher |
Universidad Alberto Hurtado - Facultad de Economía y Negocios
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| Contributor |
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| Date |
2017-04-27
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| Type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion — — |
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| Format |
application/pdf
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| Identifier |
http://www.rae-ear.org/index.php/rae/article/view/542
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| Source |
Revista de Análisis Económico - Economic Analysis Review; Vol 32, No 1 (2017); 23-46
Revista de Análisis Económico – Economic Analysis Review; Vol 32, No 1 (2017); 23-46 0718-8870 0716-5927 |
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| Language |
spa
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| Relation |
http://www.rae-ear.org/index.php/rae/article/view/542/590
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| Rights |
Copyright (c) 2017 Revista de Análisis Económico – Economic Analysis Review
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