Since 2014
The efficiency of public insurance supervision vs. Pareto efficiency
Copernican Journal of Finance & Accounting
View Archive Info| Field | Value | |
| Title |
The efficiency of public insurance supervision vs. Pareto efficiency
The efficiency of public insurance supervision vs. Pareto efficiency |
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| Creator |
Kurek, Robert; Wrocław University of Economics Nowowiejska 3, 58-500 Jelenia Góra
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| Subject |
Pareto optimality; supervision; insurance
G22; G28; D70 Pareto optimality; supervision; insurance G22; G28; D70 |
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| Description |
The objective of the paper is to research whether Pareto optimality can determine the efficiency of activities carried out by public supervision authorities by analyzing literature references and applying the method of verbal description. Having made certain assumptions, Pareto criterion can determine the model reference point in which supervision authorities’ decisions are aimed at improving the situation of consumers without resulting in the simultaneous deterioration of insurance institutions situation. It also ensures proper functioning of the entire market. However, the public aspect of the problem determines the fact that supervision authorities should not search for the model Pareto optimum, but rather focus their activities on obtaining one of many possible optimums responsible for different share of particular entities in the achieved results.
The objective of the paper is to research whether Pareto optimality can determine the efficiency of activities carried out by public supervision authorities by analyzing literature references and applying the method of verbal description. Having made certain assumptions, Pareto criterion can determine the model reference point in which supervision authorities’ decisions are aimed at improving the situation of consumers without resulting in the simultaneous deterioration of insurance institutions situation. It also ensures proper functioning of the entire market. However, the public aspect of the problem determines the fact that supervision authorities should not search for the model Pareto optimum, but rather focus their activities on obtaining one of many possible optimums responsible for different share of particular entities in the achieved results. |
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| Publisher |
Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu
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| Contributor |
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| Date |
2014-04-08
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| Type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion — — — — |
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| Format |
application/pdf
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| Identifier |
http://apcz.pl/czasopisma/index.php/CJFA/article/view/CJFA.2014.009
10.12775/CJFA.2014.009 |
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| Source |
Copernican Journal of Finance & Accounting; Vol 3, No 1 (2014); 109-119
Copernican Journal of Finance & Accounting; Vol 3, No 1 (2014); 109-119 2300-3065 2300-1240 |
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| Language |
eng
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| Relation |
http://apcz.pl/czasopisma/index.php/CJFA/article/view/CJFA.2014.009/3243
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| Coverage |
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