Shaffer's Argument For Dualism
Journal of Advances in Social Science and Humanities
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Title |
Shaffer's Argument For Dualism
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Creator |
SmytheSmythe, Thomas W.
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Description |
Jerome Shaffer has given an argument that purports to show that a person is a nonbodily thing,that we cannot identify a person with their body. A “person” is a “subject of consciousness,” or thing which thinks, wills, desires, and the like. A person is what has a particular brain and body and undergoes certain mental and physical events, states, and processes. The argument assumes that there in only a contingent connection between a person and their body. He then tries to show that what makes a given person the person they are is different from what makes their body the body it is. We arguethat Shaffer's argument illegitimately substitutes identity statements in alethic modal contexts.
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Publisher |
Journal of Advances in Social Science and Humanities
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Date |
2016-06-05
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Type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Peer-reviewed Article |
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Format |
application/pdf
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Identifier |
http://jassh.in/index.php/jassh/article/view/58
10.15520/jassh20558 |
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Source |
Journal of Advances in Social Science and Humanities; Vol 2 No 05 (2016)
2395-6542 10.15520/jassh205 |
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Language |
eng
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Relation |
http://jassh.in/index.php/jassh/article/view/58/79
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Rights |
Copyright (c) 2016 Journal of Advances in Social Science and Humanities
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