CEO Power and Auditor Choice
International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies
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Title |
CEO Power and Auditor Choice
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Creator |
Ouyang, Bo; Pennsylvania State University Great Valley
Liu, Zenghui; Western Washington University Sun, Xiaojie Christine; California State University San Marcos |
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Subject |
Accounting
Auditor switch; CEO power |
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Description |
In this paper, we examine the impact of CEO power on auditor choice. We are motivated by the competing financial reporting incentives arising from CEO power. Our empirical finding suggests that powerful CEOs are more likely to hire high-quality auditors as a signal of superior financial reporting quality. We contribute to the literature of auditor switch and extend the research on the links between CEO power and firm behaviors.
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Publisher |
SSBFNET
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Contributor |
—
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Date |
2015-10-12
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Type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Peer-reviewed Article |
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Format |
application/pdf
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Identifier |
http://www.ssbfnet.com/ojs/index.php/ijfbs/article/view/455
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Source |
International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies (ISSN: 2147- 4486); Vol 4, No 4 (2015): October; 44-51
2147-4486 |
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Language |
eng
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Relation |
http://www.ssbfnet.com/ojs/index.php/ijfbs/article/view/455/437
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Rights |
Copyright (c) 2015 International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies (ISSN: 2147- 4486)
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
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