Record Details

CEO Power and Auditor Choice

International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies

View Archive Info
 
 
Field Value
 
Title CEO Power and Auditor Choice
 
Creator Ouyang, Bo; Pennsylvania State University Great Valley
Liu, Zenghui; Western Washington University
Sun, Xiaojie Christine; California State University San Marcos
 
Subject Accounting
Auditor switch; CEO power
 
Description In this paper, we examine the impact of CEO power on auditor choice. We are motivated by the competing financial reporting incentives arising from CEO power. Our empirical finding suggests that powerful CEOs are more likely to hire high-quality auditors as a signal of superior financial reporting quality. We contribute to the literature of auditor switch and extend the research on the links between CEO power and firm behaviors.
 
Publisher SSBFNET
 
Contributor
 
Date 2015-10-12
 
Type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Peer-reviewed Article
 
Format application/pdf
 
Identifier http://www.ssbfnet.com/ojs/index.php/ijfbs/article/view/455
 
Source International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies (ISSN: 2147- 4486); Vol 4, No 4 (2015): October; 44-51
2147-4486
 
Language eng
 
Relation http://www.ssbfnet.com/ojs/index.php/ijfbs/article/view/455/437
 
Rights Copyright (c) 2015 International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies (ISSN: 2147- 4486)
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0