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The Naive Central Banker

Revista Brasileira de Economia

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Title The Naive Central Banker
 
Creator Griebeler, Marcelo de Carvalho; Federal University of Santa Catarina
 
Subject naive central bank; inflationary bias; monetary policy.
 
Description There has been in some countries a trend of assigning other functions to central banks besides price stability. The most suggested function to be added to monetary authority's obligations is to pursue economic growth or full employment. In this paper we characterize the behavior and analyse the optimal monetary policy of, what we will call, a naive central banker. We describe the naive behavior as one that does face the inflation-unemployment trade-off, but it tries to minimize both variables simultaneously. Our findings, both under discretion and commitment, indicate that the naive central banker delivers lower expected inflation and inflation variance than the benchmark behavior, whenever the economy is rigid enough. However, the degree of conservativeness also affect this result, such that the less conservative the naive policymaker, the more rigidity is necessary.
 
Publisher Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV
 
Contributor
 
Date 2015-09-30
 
Type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Articles
Artigos
 
Format application/pdf
 
Identifier http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/rbe/article/view/38225
 
Source Revista Brasileira de Economia; v. 69, n. 3 (2015): Jul-Set; 355-372
Revista Brasileira de Economia; v. 69, n. 3 (2015): Jul-Set; 355-372
0034-7140
0034-7140
 
Language por
 
Relation http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/rbe/article/view/38225/55152