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Equivalence of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in duopoly under relative profit maximization: A general analysis

Journal of Economics and Political Economy

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Title Equivalence of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in duopoly under relative profit maximization: A general analysis
 
Creator SATOH, Atsuhiro; Faculty of Economics, Doshisha University
TANAKA, Yasuhito; Faculty of Economics, Doshisha University
 
Subject relative profit maximization, duopoly, Cournot equilibrium, Bertrand equilibrium
D43, L13
 
Description Abstract. We study the relationship between Cournot equilibrium and Bertrand equilibrium in duopoly with differentiated goods in which each firm maximizes its relative profit. We show that Cournot equilibrium and Bertrand equilibrium coincide under relative profit maximization even with general demand and cost functions. This result is due to the fact that a game of relative profit maximization in duopoly is a two-person zero-sum game.Keywords. Relative profit maximization, Duopoly, Cournot equilibrium, Bertrand equilibrium.JEL. D43, L13.
 
Publisher Journal of Economics and Political Economy
Journal of Economics and Political Economy
 
Contributor
 
Date 2016-09-29
 
Type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


 
Format application/pdf
 
Identifier http://www.kspjournals.org/index.php/JEPE/article/view/986
10.1453/jepe.v3i3.986
 
Source Journal of Economics and Political Economy; Vol 3, No 3 (2016): September; 513-523
Journal of Economics and Political Economy; Vol 3, No 3 (2016): September; 513-523
2148-8347
 
Language eng
 
Relation http://www.kspjournals.org/index.php/JEPE/article/view/986/990
http://www.kspjournals.org/index.php/JEPE/article/downloadSuppFile/986/449
 
Rights Copyright (c) 2016 Journal of Economics and Political Economy
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0