Equivalence of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in duopoly under relative profit maximization: A general analysis
Journal of Economics and Political Economy
View Archive InfoField | Value | |
Title |
Equivalence of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in duopoly under relative profit maximization: A general analysis
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Creator |
SATOH, Atsuhiro; Faculty of Economics, Doshisha University
TANAKA, Yasuhito; Faculty of Economics, Doshisha University |
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Subject |
relative profit maximization, duopoly, Cournot equilibrium, Bertrand equilibrium
D43, L13 |
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Description |
Abstract. We study the relationship between Cournot equilibrium and Bertrand equilibrium in duopoly with differentiated goods in which each firm maximizes its relative profit. We show that Cournot equilibrium and Bertrand equilibrium coincide under relative profit maximization even with general demand and cost functions. This result is due to the fact that a game of relative profit maximization in duopoly is a two-person zero-sum game.Keywords. Relative profit maximization, Duopoly, Cournot equilibrium, Bertrand equilibrium.JEL. D43, L13.
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Publisher |
Journal of Economics and Political Economy
Journal of Economics and Political Economy |
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Contributor |
—
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Date |
2016-09-29
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Type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion — — |
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Format |
application/pdf
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Identifier |
http://www.kspjournals.org/index.php/JEPE/article/view/986
10.1453/jepe.v3i3.986 |
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Source |
Journal of Economics and Political Economy; Vol 3, No 3 (2016): September; 513-523
Journal of Economics and Political Economy; Vol 3, No 3 (2016): September; 513-523 2148-8347 |
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Language |
eng
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Relation |
http://www.kspjournals.org/index.php/JEPE/article/view/986/990
http://www.kspjournals.org/index.php/JEPE/article/downloadSuppFile/986/449 |
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Rights |
Copyright (c) 2016 Journal of Economics and Political Economy
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 |
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