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Electoral Control in the Presence of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

Brazilian Review of Econometrics

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Title Electoral Control in the Presence of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
Electoral Control in the Presence of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
 
Description This article studies a two-period game between voters and an elected incumbent where voters care both about controlling incumbent corruption and selecting competent incumbents. If voters’ reelection criterion is very demanding, only very competent incumbents will be reelected but corruption will be significant. Conversely, if voters use a softer reelection criterion, corruption may be more controlled but too many incompetent incumbents will be reelected. A trade-off arises in equilibrium between the incentive and the selection motives. The model is extended to include society’s risk aversion and shows that the more risk averse, the softer the voters’ reelection criterion.
This article studies a two-period game between voters and an elected incumbent where voters care both about controlling incumbent corruption and selecting competent incumbents. If voters’ reelection criterion is very demanding, only very competent incumbents will be reelected but corruption will be significant. Conversely, if voters use a softer reelection criterion, corruption may be more controlled but too many incompetent incumbents will be reelected. A trade-off arises in equilibrium between the incentive and the selection motives. The model is extended to include society’s risk aversion and shows that the more risk averse, the softer the voters’ reelection criterion.
 
Publisher Sociedade Brasileira de Econometria
 
Date 2008-05-01
 
Type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
 
Format application/pdf
application/pdf
 
Identifier http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/bre/article/view/1516
10.12660/bre.v28n12008.1516
 
Source Brazilian Review of Econometrics; Vol. 28 No. 1 (2008); 17-50
Brazilian Review of Econometrics; v. 28 n. 1 (2008); 17-50
1980-2447
 
Language eng
por
 
Relation http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/bre/article/view/1516/940
http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/bre/article/view/1516/941