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Bayesian foundations of nash equilibrium behaviour

Brazilian Review of Econometrics

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Title Bayesian foundations of nash equilibrium behaviour
Bayesian foundations of nash equilibrium behaviour
 
Creator Werlang, Sergio Ribeiro da Costa; IMPA and EPGE/FGV.
 
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Description This is part of a larger project to investigate the Bayesian foundations of non-cooperative solution concepts. Elsewhere Bernheim and Pearce prove that common knowledge of Bayesian rationality is not enough to justify the non-cooperative solution concept defined by Nash. Here several alternative behavioural assumptions are considered. In general the coordination required to achieve a Nash equilibrium is very strong. Not only Bayesian rationality, but also the actions taken, have to be common knowledge . For particular kinds of games the coordination required is not as strong.
This is part of a larger project to investigate the Bayesian foundations of non-cooperative solution concepts. Elsewhere Bernheim and Pearce prove that common knowledge of Bayesian rationality is not enough to justify the non-cooperative solution concept defined by Nash. Here several alternative behavioural assumptions are considered. In general the coordination required to achieve a Nash equilibrium is very strong. Not only Bayesian rationality, but also the actions taken, have to be common knowledge . For particular kinds of games the coordination required is not as strong.
 
Publisher Sociedade Brasileira de Econometria
 
Date 1986-04-01
 
Type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
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Format application/pdf
 
Identifier http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/bre/article/view/3119
10.12660/bre.v6n11986.3119
 
Source Brazilian Review of Econometrics; Vol 6, No 1 (1986); 41-78
Brazilian Review of Econometrics; Vol 6, No 1 (1986); 41-78
1980-2447
 
Language eng
 
Relation http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/bre/article/view/3119/2015