Since 2014
Regulatory Agencies: Captive Agents or Hegemonic Apparatuses
Studies in Political Economy
View Archive Info| Field | Value | |
| Title |
Regulatory Agencies: Captive Agents or Hegemonic Apparatuses
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| Creator |
Mahon, Rianne
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| Subject |
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| Description |
The extension of the state's authority into the economic sphere in advanced capitalist formations has entailed not only the growth of the regular departmental apparatus but also the multiplication of independent boards and commissions whose legitimacy is seen to reside in their insulation from political pressure and their technical expertise. Critics of such agencies, however, have pointed to the ironic fact that rather than increasing the state's capacity to ensure that corporate decisions accord with the 'public interest' the proliferation of such institutions has rendered the state more vulnerable to corporate influence.
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| Publisher |
Studies in Political Economy
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| Contributor |
—
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| Date |
2010-05-25
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| Type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion — — |
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| Format |
application/pdf
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| Identifier |
http://spe.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/spe/article/view/14059
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| Source |
Studies in Political Economy; Vol 1 (1979): Issue #1
1918-7033 0707-8552 |
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| Language |
eng
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| Relation |
http://spe.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/spe/article/view/14059/10941
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| Coverage |
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