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Does banking relationship configuration affect the risk-taking behavior of French SMEs?

Economics and Business Letters

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Title Does banking relationship configuration affect the risk-taking behavior of French SMEs?
 
Creator Vigneron, Ludovic; Valenciennes University, France
Benkraiem, Ramzi; Audencia Nantes School of Management, France
 
Description Using a new and unique dataset dealing with French small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) financing that provides detailed information about 1 116 firm-bank relationships, we test how the number of banks with which a firm works and the organizational structure of its main bank influence its risk-taking behavior. We find evidence that SMEs engaged with a decentralized main bank (a local or mutual one) invest in less risky projects, especially when they work with fewer than three banks (one or two). We also find evidence that single-bank SMEs engaged with a centralized bank (a large or foreign one) take significantly more risks than the others.
 
Publisher Oviedo University Press
 
Contributor —
 
Date 2015-11-25
 
Type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
—
 
Format application/pdf
 
Identifier http://www.unioviedo.es/reunido/index.php/EBL/article/view/10919
10.17811/ebl.4.4.2015.166-174
 
Source Economics and Business Letters; Vol 4, No 4 (2015): December - Special Issue Debt and Sustainability; 166-174
Economics and Business Letters; Vol 4, No 4 (2015): December - Special Issue Debt and Sustainability; 166-174
2254-4380
10.17811/ebl.4.4.2015
 
Language eng
 
Relation http://www.unioviedo.es/reunido/index.php/EBL/article/view/10919/10543
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