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Tarificación de la Transmisión Eléctrica: Por Qué Licitar Es (Mucho) Mejor que Regular
Economic Analysis Review
View Archive Info| Field | Value | |
| Title |
Tarificación de la Transmisión Eléctrica: Por Qué Licitar Es (Mucho) Mejor que Regular
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| Creator |
Galetovic, Alexander
Inostroza, Juan Ricardo |
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| Description |
There are at least two ways of fixing high voltage transmission tolls.One is to regulate them in standard fashion; another is to allocate newtransmission lines in competitive auctions to the bidder offering the lowesttoll. In this paper we show that expected tolls are considerably lower iflines are auctioned.Auctions dominate regulation for three reasons. First, bidder competitionensures lower expected tolls. Second, they increase the regulator’s bargainingpower. Third, if, as in Argentina, project users are allowed tobid and build the line, they can induce even more intense competition.We use our theoretical model to analyze the auction for the fourthComahue line in Argentina. We show that, had the toll been regulated,it would have been at least 61% higher.
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| Publisher |
Universidad Alberto Hurtado - Facultad de Economía y Negocios
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| Contributor |
—
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| Date |
2010-03-01
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| Type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion — — |
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| Format |
application/pdf
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| Identifier |
http://www.rae-ear.org/index.php/rae/article/view/36
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| Source |
Revista de Análisis Económico - Economic Analysis Review; Vol 19, No 1 (2004); 77-117
Revista de Análisis Económico – Economic Analysis Review; Vol 19, No 1 (2004); 77-117 0718-8870 0716-5927 |
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| Language |
spa
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| Relation |
http://www.rae-ear.org/index.php/rae/article/view/36/70
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