Since 2014
Four Issues in Auctions and Market Design
Economic Analysis Review
View Archive Info| Field | Value | |
| Title |
Four Issues in Auctions and Market Design
Four Issues in Auctions and Market Design |
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| Creator |
Preston McAfee, R.
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| Description |
Market designs concerns creation of transaction rules, effectively an automated intermediary. I extend the work of Vives (1998), finding that, for moderately sized auction markets, coordination is more important than strategic behavior in determining efficiency. Second, with Cournot competition, small firm send to win auctions of licences (right to compete) tend to have inefficient outcomes. Finally, I describe on-going work to design selling mechanism for the purpose of extracting surplus when there is only one buyer.
Market designs concerns creation of transaction rules, effectively an automated intermediary. I extend the work of Vives (1998), finding that, for moderately sized auction markets, coordination is more important than strategic behavior in determining efficiency. Second, with Cournot competition, small firm send to win auctions of licences (right to compete) tend to have inefficient outcomes. Finally, I describe on-going work to design selling mechanism for the purpose of extracting surplus when there is only one buyer. |
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| Publisher |
Universidad Alberto Hurtado - Facultad de Economía y Negocios
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| Contributor |
—
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| Date |
2010-03-07
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| Type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion — — |
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| Format |
application/pdf
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| Identifier |
http://www.rae-ear.org/index.php/rae/article/view/117
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| Source |
Revista de Análisis Económico - Economic Analysis Review; Vol 13, No 1 (1998); 7-24
Revista de Análisis Económico – Economic Analysis Review; Vol 13, No 1 (1998); 7-24 0718-8870 0716-5927 |
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| Language |
eng
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| Relation |
http://www.rae-ear.org/index.php/rae/article/view/117/226
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