Since 2014
Credit Game Study between the Bank and the Enterprise in China
Advances in Applied Economics and Finance
View Archive Info| Field | Value | |
| Title |
Credit Game Study between the Bank and the Enterprise in China
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| Creator |
Yu, Xiao-hua; University of Shanghai for Science and Technology
Zhang, Ling; University of Shanghai for Science and Technology |
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| Subject |
credit risk; credit game; information asymmetry; payoff
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| Description |
There exist both cooperation and competition between commercial banks and enterprises regarding to credit transactions. How to achieve mutual benefits and reduce credit risk has always been a major issue for China’s banking industry. This paper establishes a credit game model between the bank and the enterprise, trying to find out the root cause of credit risk and possible ways to improve the situation. The result shows that the information delivery in the market plays an important role in each player’s behavioral options and that the information asymmetry may lead to the agreement failure on credit loans and increase credit risk. With heavier punishment of dishonest behavior and repeated games, enterprises tend to be honest to obtain long-term benefits. At the end of the paper, a series of measures such as increasing punishment cost, creating a sound credit system, etc are suggested to avoid the adverse selection and reduce the moral risk.
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| Publisher |
World Science Publisher
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| Contributor |
—
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| Date |
2012-08-26
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| Type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion — |
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| Format |
application/x-download
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| Identifier |
http://worldsciencepublisher.org/journals/index.php/AAEF/article/view/663
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| Source |
Advances in Applied Economics and Finance; Vol 2, No 1 (2012); 277-280
2167-6348 |
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| Language |
eng
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| Relation |
http://worldsciencepublisher.org/journals/index.php/AAEF/article/view/663/545
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| Rights |
Copyright NoticeProposed Creative Commons Copyright Notices1. Proposed Policy for Journals That Offer Open AccessAuthors who publish with this journal agree to the following terms:Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License that allows others to share the work with an acknowledgement of the work's authorship and initial publication in this journal.Authors are able to enter into separate, additional contractual arrangements for the non-exclusive distribution of the journal's published version of the work (e.g., post it to an institutional repository or publish it in a book), with an acknowledgement of its initial publication in this journal.Authors are permitted and encouraged to post their work online (e.g., in institutional repositories or on their website) prior to and during the submission process, as it can lead to productive exchanges, as well as earlier and greater citation of published work (See The Effect of Open Access).Proposed Policy for Journals That Offer Delayed Open AccessAuthors who publish with this journal agree to the following terms:Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication, with the work [SPECIFY PERIOD OF TIME] after publication simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License that allows others to share the work with an acknowledgement of the work's authorship and initial publication in this journal.Authors are able to enter into separate, additional contractual arrangements for the non-exclusive distribution of the journal's published version of the work (e.g., post it to an institutional repository or publish it in a book), with an acknowledgement of its initial publication in this journal.Authors are permitted and encouraged to post their work online (e.g., in institutional repositories or on their website) prior to and during the submission process, as it can lead to productive exchanges, as well as earlier and greater citation of published work (See The Effect of Open Access).
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