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Growth Opportunities, Agency Conflicts, and the Effectiveness of Busy Outside Directors
Journal of Financial Studies
View Archive Info| Field | Value | |
| Title |
Growth Opportunities, Agency Conflicts, and the Effectiveness of Busy Outside Directors
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| Creator |
Chia-Wei Chen
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| Description |
In this paper, we focus on potential tradeoffs between the costs and benefits of multiple directorships held by outside directors and attempt to determine how firm characteristics affect such tradeoffs. It is widely believed that outside directors of a firm play important functions of monitoring and advising. As a result, the basic hypothesis of this paper is that multiple directorships by outside directors can have different implications for firms that have different levels of monitoring and advising needs. Consistent with this hypothesis, our findings suggest that firm performance is positively associated with multiple directorships for firms with high growth opportunities and low agency conflicts. Such firms would benefit more from better advising while not suffering much from less monitoring. Likewise, firm performance is negatively associated with multiple directorships for firms likely with low growth opportunities and high agency conflicts. Key words: Multiple directorships, Boards of directors, Agency costs |
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| Publisher |
Journal of Financial Studies
財務金èžå¸åˆŠ |
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| Date |
2011-03-10
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| Type |
—
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| Format |
application/pdf
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| Identifier |
http://www.jfs.org.tw/index.php/jfs/article/view/2011052
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| Source |
Journal of Financial Studies; Vol 17, No 4 (2009); 123
財務金èžå¸åˆŠ; Vol 17, No 4 (2009); 123 |
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| Language |
—
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