Since 2014
Will Corporate Governance Reduce Illegal Insider Trading?
Journal of Financial Studies
View Archive Info| Field | Value | |
| Title |
Will Corporate Governance Reduce Illegal Insider Trading?
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| Creator |
Lee-Young Cheng
Yung-Jang Wang Yu-Wei Wang |
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| Description |
We investigate whether the firm characteristics, the structure of the board of directors and the structure of ownership affect the illegal insider trading from 1996 to 2006. We find that when the firms have bad news, more convicts, asymmetric information, no or few independence director, low institutional shareholdings or no any payment for directors, the convicts can get more profits. In addition, we estimate a logistic regression modeling the probability of illegal insider trading. We find that the firms with asymmetric information, family business, low institutional stockholdings and no payment for directors, due to agency problem and poor monitoring system, are more likely to have illegal insider trading. Key words: Illegal insider trading, Agency problem, Family business, Independent director, Ownership structure |
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| Publisher |
Journal of Financial Studies
財務金èžå¸åˆŠ |
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| Date |
2011-03-10
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| Type |
—
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| Format |
application/pdf
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| Identifier |
http://www.jfs.org.tw/index.php/jfs/article/view/2011042
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| Source |
Journal of Financial Studies; Vol 18, No 1 (2010); 55
財務金èžå¸åˆŠ; Vol 18, No 1 (2010); 55 |
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| Language |
—
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